Five reasons document the Greek Cypriot side’s failure to act on the Famagusta issue

Interview with Giorgos Loucaides, AKEL Parliamentary Representative
Q: How do you comment on the fact that the UN Secretary General, in his Good Offices Report, appears to be more demanding on both leaders, the political leadership and society to assume responsibility for the Cyprus problem?
GL: The interpretation of the above-mentioned reference in the UN Secretary General’s report, as well as his other similar references, indicate that we are dangerously close to a definitive stalemate and that time is running out. Since there is little or no way we can influence and determine the attitude of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership, we have to see what we as the Greek Cypriot side can do. For that reason, the President of the Republic must urgently change course, taking all the necessary actions to convince everyone in the international community – and more specifically those involved on the Cyprus problem – of his genuine intentions to promote a solution to the Cyprus problem. The President must at long last convince that what he says he means and puts it into practice.
Q: Why so much dithering over Varosha when it was known 4 years ago that 1) the map submitted by the Turkish Cypriot side and which included the return of the Varosha was withdrawn and 2) Turkey would exploit the absence of any negotiations?
GL: Your reference to the Greek Cypriot side’s negligence is absolutely correct. We should add the following to this reference:
First, the map in question was withdrawn by the Turkish Cypriots after the Greek Cypriot side was the first to announce the withdrawal of the convergences that had been recorded.
Second, there was not only a failure to act on the part of Mr. Anastasiades, but even worse, there was an erroneous assessment made of the danger of Famagusta being colonalised, given that when the issue arose in 2019, the Foreign Minister was talking about “communication games” by Turkey.
Thirdly, the DISY government pinned its hopes on developing military cooperation on the one hand, and on the other hand made the imposition of severe sanctions on Turkey an end in itself, as a means of countering Turkish provocative actions and the imposition of new fait accompli. Judging by the results, both of the government’s strategic options have been an abject failure.
Fourthly, it may be that Turkey imposed its chosen one, the advocate of partition Ersin Tatar, on the leadership of the Turkish Cypriot community, but unfortunately Nicos Anastasiades facilitated Turkey to do so.
Fifth, the Greek Cypriot side was also assigned the blame for the prolonged deadlock on the Cyprus problem, with Turkey being acquitted and praised for its stance at Crans Montana but also with Nicos Anastasiades handling the Cyprus problem through regressions, contradictions and politically criminal handlings that went as far as questioning the solution of bizonal, bicommunal federation and flirting with a two state solution. Handlings that have led to the President’s international disrepute with regards the Cyprus problem.
As AKEL had been warning from the very beginning, it was predictable that Turkey would attempt to exploit all of this to the very end, given that judging by the result Turkish fait accompli and plans have been facilitated, rather than hindered. The above-mentioned also goes a long way towards explaining the international community’s lukewarm/timid to non-existent reaction to this enormous and massive provocation by Turkey.
Q: Do you agree with the view that if Varosha is lost, so is the hope for a solution to the Cyprus problem?
GL: We believe it is reasonable for someone to conclude that Turkey, by deciding to bury after 47 years its main bargaining card on the issue of Territory, that is to say the enclosed area of Famagusta, decided at the same time to bury the Cyprus problem itself and the prospect of its solution. For that reason, we are very much afraid that the implementation of the road map decided by Turkey and the current Turkish Cypriot leadership for the colonalisation of Famagusta will – possibly – be the last nail in the coffin of the prospect for a solution of the Cyprus problem.
Q: What initiatives can the Greek Cypriot side take to prevent the further drift towards partition?
GL: What we need to do first and foremost is to seek the resumption of substantive negotiations for a comprehensive solution of the Cyprus problem. This is, in our view, the most suitable and available way to seek to save not only Famagusta, but also to free Cyprus from the pain, abomination and the dangerous anachronism of the occupation.
Towards this end, AKEL has been submitting its views on the Cyprus problem in writing to the President of the Republic for the past six months. A number of initiatives must be taken in all directions to ensure a strong and substantive reaction from the international community and Cyprus’ EU partners to this unprecedented provocation and fait accompli that Turkey has attempted against Cyprus and the prospect of a solution to the Cyprus problem.