THE financial crisis in Cyprus raises two interesting questions. Of Russia and Europe, which needs the other more? And despite the outrage from Russian depositors who’ve lost money in their Cypriot bank accounts, could the crisis ultimately help Russia?

At first glance, it seems that Russia depends heavily on the rest of Europe. Almost 60 percent of Russian exports — primarily oil and gas — go to the European Union and other European countries like Switzerland.

Russians have deposited billions of euros in Cyprus’s banks, and the controversial decision by the lenders who bailed out Cyprus’s flailing economy to impose a so-called haircut on large depositors affected many Russians.

But Moscow has less to worry about than it first appears. Russia suffers not so much from the Euro zone’s problems as its own outdated business practices. And it is not financially dependent on Europe. To the contrary, most foreign direct investment does not come to Russia from the heart of the European Union, but rather from offshore areas like Cyprus, the British Virgin Islands and Bermuda (a British territory). Germany, in contrast, accounted for just 4 percent of foreign direct investment in Russia.

Almost all of these overseas deposits consist of Russian money that was accumulated outside of Russia. It’s true that some of it is “dirty” money from corrupt deals, and even more was channeled offshore to evade taxes. But the bulk of the cash flows occurred so that Russian investors could protect their money from possible litigation in Russia’s courts, which are not truly independent and as a result leave little confidence in the rule of law.

Paradoxically, the economic problems in Europe might benefit Russia. Some of the money hidden offshore might be forced to come home. And politically, the crisis in Europe has allowed Russian leaders to spread nationalist propaganda, insisting that Russia is rising from its knees while the European project falls apart.

Even so, Russian elites are understandably nervous. For the last few years, wealthy Russians have been buying up European real estate — turning some of London’s poshest neighborhoods into foreign-owned enclaves — and more than three million Russians now have European Union residency permits, which gives them an exit strategy should the volatile political situation at home turn sour.

When the discussions of a Cyprus rescue plan among European Union leaders began to include talk of confiscating a share of deposits in Cypriot banks , Russian leaders expressed shock and outrage. President Vladimir V. Putin labeled the move “intolerable.” Prime Minister Dmitri A. Medvedev admitted that there were “government funds” in bank accounts and said the tax amounted to the “stealing of what has already been stolen.”

The Russian government considered bailing out Cyprus. But the Kremlin quickly realized that a full-scale rescue could cost it close to six billion euros (about $7.5 billion) and a possible bank run in Cyprus might require 20 to 40 billion euros (about $26 billion to $51 billion) to cover depositors’ withdrawals and recapitalize the country’s banking system.

They also understood that even taking complete control over Cyprus’s financial system would give Russia no significant voice in the euro zone — making such a move useless in political terms. This contributed to the failure of negotiations in Moscow about bailing Cyprus out in exchange for granting Gazprom, the state-controlled oil giant, rights for exploration of offshore gas fields around the island (complicating the matter, the oil fields are in waters claimed by Turkey). Cypriot politicians, facing near-revolt at home, returned to the European Union seeking an alternative solution.

This benefited Moscow in three ways. First, Russia’s commercial bank in Cyprus, VTB, wasn’t forced to seize any of its clients’ deposits, meaning it might emerge from the crisis as the island’s most trusted financial institution. Second, while the Russian government decided not to help Russian private account holders, it declared that Russian businesses incorporated on Cyprus could get financial support from a Russian state-owned bank, VEB. Finally, several Russian oligarchs like Alexei Mordashov, Andrei Akimov and Yuri Kovalchuk (an old friend of Mr. Putin) seem to have been warned and withdrew their funds in early March. As a result, the pro-bailout constituency in Moscow lost a huge number of potential supporters and there was less pressure on Mr. Putin to undertake a costly rescue of Cyprus.

A 20- to 40-billion-euro rescue operation would have been too much for Russia at a time when the state budget is facing a growing deficit and must also provide financing for the 2014 Winter Olympics and 2018 World Cup. Also, the government has begun a fierce rhetorical attack on corruption, so it wouldn’t have looked particularly good to bail out Cyprus, where a lot of  “dirty” Russian money is believed to be parked.

In the end, the overall damage of the Cyprus crisis probably won’t exceed 1 percent of Russia’s G.D.P., but there will be major consequences for Russia’s private sector.

Russian businesspeople believed for many years that storing their money in law-abiding countries would compensate for the absence of the rule of law in their own country. Today, it has become clear that this tactic may not be sufficient anymore. After all, countries that possess a solid financial sector also tend to have high taxes and laws against corruption and money laundering. And several havens like Iceland, Latvia and Cyprus are no longer considered financially safe.

Moreover, pressure on business owners at home is growing. Mr. Putin has started a new series of tax hikes, aimed at midsize businesses; more than 300,000 small businesses have closed since the start of this year, and the Kremlin has introduced new legislation effectively paralyzing independent nongovernmental organizations.

Russian oligarchs and policy makers (generally the same social group) have also learned from the Cypriot crisis that their money and power cannot influence European decision makers when it comes to saving a small Mediterranean island from insolvency, because Russia has no political voice within the European Union. Given this dynamic, it would be much more productive for Russia to get closer to Europe rather than stay away from it — and the pressure from Russian businesses on the government to do so will likely grow.

The Kremlin must act faster to make Russia more investment-friendly so that money stops leaving the country; Russian companies should become more flexible so they can easily enter the European market during hard economic times; and, most important, honest businesspeople should become more politicized.

In 2011, a small segment of the middle class took to the streets in protest after the parliamentary elections. If a huge segment of the Russian business community were to rise up asking for a better governance, more democracy and an effective judiciary, it might pose a true challenge for Mr. Putin’s regime.