Do you consider that Turkey all these years, especially lately since Crans Montana has shown tangible examples and contributed towards the efforts to reach a solution? What is AKEL’s position on the agreement that seems to be achieved on the East Med pipeline? Do you consider that Turkey isn’t making any efforts whatsoever to give information on the issue of the missing persons?

AK: As far as Turkey’s overall role is concerned, I think there is a consensus and understanding among all of us that Turkey is the main reason why we have not yet been able to reach an agreement. It is aggressive, it is provocative, and sometimes Turkey is attempting to act in an expansionist way, in a way that is very troublesome. This should be taken into account when setting out our own tactics. When you have such an opponent acting in such a way, you have to be extremely careful. You should avoid any mistakes, both on the substance and in tactics.

What we are therefore accusing Anastasiades of is his contradictions, regressions, constant shifting from the positions which we have set out over time, a fact that facilitates Turkey in promoting its goals. That’s the reason we are criticizing Mr. Anastasiades. We also criticize him for the fact that at the critical time he didn’t act in a way that would go to the very end and force Turkey to either take a positive stand as to the demands of the UN Secretary-General, or to remain exposed.

As far as the issue of the missing persons is concerned, Turkey and the occupying army are unquestionably unjustified, because they do not provide the necessary information for us to be able to resolve all the cases. We must continue the effort. I think that if the talks and negotiations proceed in a positive way, this will also facilitate our efforts to verify the fate of the missing persons. That is, the cooperation of the Turkish side.

As far as the East Med issue is concerned, I heard what the Government Spokesman said this morning. There is absolutely nothing specific about this issue. Our own demand is first and foremost that the Cyprus problem should be solved in a correct way, a solution that will correspond to the visions and aspirations of the Cypriot people as a whole, not just of the Greek Cypriots, but for sure not just of the Turkish Cypriots as well, and even more so of course not Turkey’s goals.

From there onwards, we must now discuss on the basis of economic and political facts, but mainly economic facts to take decisions. Our position is very clear. The attempt to exclude anyone, from a wider cooperation in the eastern Mediterranean area can only provoke tensions and frictions. This doesn’t serve the well-intentioned interests of the peoples of the region, which are served only through and by achieving peace and stability.

You said some people are claiming that Mr. Anastasiades confided in them that he is looking for or seeking another solution. At another point in your speech you said that the abandonment of federation is being discussed in high places. I call on you to be specific and tell us whether Turkish Foreign Minister Mr. Cavusoglou, whom you met on Thursday, also says something like that, namely that Mr. Anastasiades confided in him. And just a moment ago, Mr. Akinci from the Bosporus summit said that if the unilateral actions of the Greek Cypriots continue, the tension in the region will intensify. Do you consider that such positions help towards the resumption of negotiations?

AK: Firstly, I think there are very specific elements. The Deputy President of the “Citizens Alliance” party said publicly that between the first and second round of the Presidential elections Mr. Anastasiades confided in them that we are seeking another solution; a solution that will have elements of both confederation and a two state solution. This is very specific. The government did not reply to this very specific statement made by “Citizens Alliance” Deputy President Mr. Savvides.

Secondly, DISY Spokesperson Mr. Prodromou, in an interview with state radio station CBC, said that it is a fact that the President of the Republic in discussions with leaders of states and other diplomats tells them that “Turkey wants a two-state solution, what do you think”? And when he realised the mistake he had committed he tried to turn things around by saying that “you know, the President of course doesn’t accept that”. Why, since he doesn’t accept it, is he asking others to take a position on this issue?

As for Mr. Cavusoglou, if he has something to say he himself will say it. I am not Mr. Cavusoglou’s lawyer, regardless of whether I have met him. He told me many interesting things, and I hope and I wish these things at some point will be made public.

 

 

As regards Mr. Akinci’s statements. I also said in my speech in the debate in Ankara last Friday that such statements do not help at all. Everyone must understand that Cyprus is a sovereign state and has every right to proceed with the implementation of its energy program. And this right must be exercised by the Republic of Cyprus.

At the same time of course, we are telling Mr. Anastasiades that it is naive to believe that without a solution of the Cyprus problem we will be able to make use of the natural wealth we have, unhindered. We will have to deal with many difficulties. That is why the continuation of the energy program must be accompanied by the demonstration of readiness, genuine readiness, not words, but actions, for a resumption of substantive negotiations that will reach a solution of the Cyprus problem as soon as possible.

What do you think are the motives behind the President of the Republic’s change of attitude? Because last week, some references you made that he is particularly influenced by Israel and the country’s Prime Minister, Mr. Netanyahu, have come to light. Is what colleagues have asked previously, that is the East Med pipeline also included among these motives and is it perhaps an attempt to exclude Turkey from energy plans in the Eastern Mediterranean.

AK: The first thing I want to say is that I did not make any public reference to what you are referring to. However, I think some conclusions can be drawn easily.

As far as Israel is concerned, first and foremost, the Netanyahu government’s perception of what their relationship with the Palestinians should be is obvious. It believes that they cannot live together and that the policy should be the construction of a definitive wall. This is Mr. Netanyahu’s perception of how problems are solved in countries where different ethnicities exist. From there onwards, everyone can draw their own conclusions about what his approach with regards Cyprus might be.

The second thing I want to say is that many people attribute many motives to Mr. Anastasiades. Numerous motives. One motive is that he thinks he cannot convince the people to approve a proposal for a solution of Bi-zonal Bi-communal Federation in a possible referendum.

The other account is that the current state of affairs suits him.

Another is that he is influenced by Israel. I cannot know what’s inside Mr. Anastasiades’ mind, nor can I know why he has moved from the positions he supported up to now. What we conclude is that there is this shift in positions. He takes a stand by expressing diametrically opposed positions to those he was saying until very recently. You need to ask him to explain in a documented way why he considers what he says today is the same as what he was saying two years ago.

Since the conversation has been focused on your meeting with the Turkish Foreign Minister, do you return in an optimistic mood after your trip to Turkey, where you also spoke to an audience, a think tank I believe? After your meeting with Mr. Cavusoglou, are you more optimistic? And I would also like to hear the presumption that leads you to this feeling.

AK: You want me to reveal what we said with Mr. Cavusoglou. Unfortunately, I cannot do that. It was a meeting, you realize, where what was discussed cannot be made public.

First let me say a few words about the discussion we had at the TEPAV research centre. Diplomats, academics, PhD students of journalism were all invited. A high-level audience and I think my speech has been circulated in public.

Our position was very clear and I repeat that AKEL doesn’t express its position according to the audience it addresses. AKEL expresses its views in a steadfast way in line with the long-standing positions that it has on the solution of the Cyprus problem, but also on other important geopolitical issues, such as the issue of hydrocarbons, the wider cooperation that must exist in the region of the Eastern Mediterranean, and so on. Although I criticized Turkey very strongly for the policies it is pursuing, about the threats it is issuing on various occasions, I must tell you that both the organizers, but also the people who participated in the discussion, were fully satisfied and considered what we had to say as extremely important.

Now, do I return more optimistic or more pessimistic? I will say that much of what we have been saying lately has been confirmed in the discussion we had with Mr. Cavusoglou. Things are extremely difficult, and are made more difficult by the fact that we do not have a firm understanding of what the government ultimately wants to achieve through the negotiations.

It is no coincidence that in Mr. Cavusoglou’s interview (Note: to a daily Greek Cypriot newspaper) he raised an important question: “Tell us what you want”. It is no coincidence that he put this question in his interview, and in my opinion it will take tremendous efforts to ensure that the Cyprus problem can remain within the agreed framework and that a solution can be reached.

We believe that these things can be achieved, provided that we discuss sincerely. And if Mr. Anastasiades really means what he says, that is, right now we need the best possible unity of the Cypriot people – and we fully agree with this finding that things are extremely dangerous – there is only one way we can achieve this. Namely, our commitment to the agreed framework of the solution. If Mr. Anastasiades understands this, then the possibilities of the broadest possible convergence being forged might exist.

You referred to the interview given by Mr. Cavusoglou and the question of whether we know what we want. Do you believe Turkey knows what it wants ultimately? As Mr. Akinci says, we need to discuss Bizonal, Bicommunal Federation exclusively, Mr. Cavusoglou says I am discussing all solutions. Did Mr. Cavusoglou clarify what solution we are talking about? You accuse Mr. Anastasiades of taking some steps that in fact show that in essence are leading us somewhere else and you say that we must remain steadfast on Mr. Guterres proposals in all the facts. As for energy, why should we think very carefully about Turkey when the Republic is signing agreements with foreign companies, do what all recognized states do officially, proceeding to its energy program as it should?

AK: Let’s start with the second question. You know, we were saying slogans like, “well, why should we take Turkey’s demands into account as we are a sovereign state, we have the right to say whatever we want, to do as we please” before 1974 as well. And unfortunately we know what the result was. I am not saying that Turkey’s threats should frighten us and force us to move from the positions we have formulated or accept a bad solution as a result of these threats.

What I am saying, as I said before too, is that we should be aware that the exercise of our sovereign rights on energy issues must be accompanied by the demonstration of simultaneous political will for a solution to the Cyprus problem, on the basis of the agreed principles. That’s what we have to do. And if we do that, Turkey will either be forced to cooperate or remain exposed.

Right now, what do we have? Turkey behaves provocatively and aggressively as you say, is being exonerated by the United Nations, and we are in the dock as the accused. These are the facts, no matter what the government says. These facts are recorded in the report submitted by the UN Secretary-General. And if the government disagrees with what the Secretary-General wrote in his report, the very simple thing it should have done – the least it should have done on 17th September (when the report was tabled) – was to tell Mr. Guterres that “what you are writing is unacceptable”. It should have told him that “developments at Crans Montana evolved differently, not as you describe them”. The government didn’t do that. Justifiable questions are being raised.

Why didn’t the government do so this elementary thing if developments had evolved as it itself argues?

Does Turkey know now what it wants? If you ask me, Turkey will be satisfied with a solution that won’t provoke any trouble for it. It will be satisfied with a solution that will secure the maximalist demands it has on the Cyprus problem.

The crucial question is, what are we doing to make it harder for Turkey to force it to come to the table and discuss all that the Secretary-General of the United Nations has written in his Framework – which I have referred to so as not to repeat them?

What are we doing to make it harder and to force it us to discuss on this basis?

Do we do that by pursuing a policy characterized by contradictions and regressions?

I said before that we are simply facilitating Turkey.

In the past, Mr. Cavusoglou has made references that the Greek Cypriot side is dreaming if it thinks that Turkish guarantees will be abolished in Cyprus, that there is no question of the withdrawal of the Turkish troops, that the collapse at Crans Montana is exclusively the fault of the Greek Cypriot side because it did not make a move, especially as regards its position for zero army, zero guarantees, zero intervention rights and that all this is not going to lead to a workable solution. At the same time, you have made a reference that Mr. Cavusoglou has told you many and various things. More specifically, on this point which expresses Turkey’s long standing position, how can we be more optimistic that we are heading towards a just, viable and viable solution to the Cyprus problem with these positions that Mr. Cavusoglou puts forth almost on a daily basis on the part of Turkey.

AK: Mr. Cavusoglou did indeed say these things and repeated them in his interview to “Politis” newspaper as well. This is the Turkish position which is projected and put forth before negotiations. And he clarified it in his own interview to the newspaper, namely that if you want to discuss these issues, wait until we engage in negotiations. What do you want me to tell you now about the guarantees – that we are ready to make concessions when there are no negotiations? He also said at the same time in his interview that at Crans Montana they had made a plan of 4 points of concession. And he says we only reached the second point in the negotiations because the possibility of discussing all the rest wasn’t given.

So what do we have to do to see whether Turkey is ready to go to the point that we want to reach, or to see whether it will insist on these intransigent positions and the provocative positions it is expressing in public?

The only way to find out is to go into negotiations. There is no other way to find out. By insisting on principles, we, on our part, should take them into negotiations. The Secretary-General wrote in his Framework that no guarantees and intervention rights can be accepted, that this is an anachronism. That is precisely where Turkey will either clash with the UN Secretary-General or be forced to cooperate in order to reach an agreement.

Things are that simple in our own opinion.

And I repeat: given that the Guterres Framework according to Mr. Anastasiades was formulated because of his own leading role and is so good, why then is he afraid of it, given that it meets our fundamental concerns?

Why didn’t we continue, and there either Turkey would have been exposed or have agreed?

You also said in your initial statements that although Mr. Akinci had called for the resumption of negotiations on the basis of the Guterres framework last April, President Anastasiades did not proceed to a resumption of talks. However, how could this happen, given that there is a different interpretation by both sides as regards the Framework? How do you think our side should proceed if we don’t arrive at a conclusion on the whole issue of the terms of reference?

AK: First and foremost as regards the different interpretation attributed to the Guterres Framework. The negotiations are being carried out by the United Nations itself and I imagine that we all acknowledge that the Secretary-General knows what he said about his Framework. There is therefore no cause for concern. Regardless of whether we had a different interpretation back then, the Secretary-General knows, and because the negotiations would have been conducted under his own auspices, he would have given the right interpretation. This is the first thing I want to say.

The second thing I want to say is that the UN Secretary-General in all the successive reports he has prepared, refers to the Framework he submitted on 30th June. We are the only ones talking about a Framework of 4th July, and that must be a cause for concern.

Why didn’t we tell the Secretary-General that “what you are writing in your report is wrong and the framework is the one on the 4th July”?

Why did not we protest about these key issues?

Now, what must we do if the attempt to agree on the terms of reference fails? Honestly, if the attempt to reach an agreement on the terms of reference fails, I do not know what we can do to save the situation. So what I will say is that we need to work with consistency and firmly so that we come to the terms of reference – not with unacceptable concessions on our part, as Mr. Anastasiades is attempting to convince the people that AKEL is supposedly calling on him to do, but by insisting on the agreed principles of the solution of the Cyprus problem.

Furthermore, let me say this, because sometimes leading officials of the governing DISY party and the Government Spokesman come out and accuse us that we are supposedly demanding from the President that he should make unacceptable concessions, I will tell them that to discuss a two states solution or a confederation is not an unacceptable concession – it is treason.

The argument that the model is unrealistic is an argument about which Turkey also refers to. How do we reply to Turkey? Have you observed the Turkish Cypriots distancing themselves from the solution of federation?

AK: As regards Turkey’s position which Mr. Cavusoglou expressed in an interview too, that we must discuss other models of solution as well, he does not say that he excludes Bi-zonal, Bi-communal Federation. He says it is extremely difficult to achieve.

Our own reply is that we have to persist. Woe if we accept to discuss confederation or a two-state solution. I repeat that such a move is treacherous, and that it will only bring disaster to the country. I have said beforehand what the consequences would be, because whether a confederation or two states we are in effect talking about partition and I have said what the negative elements of partition are.

Now, with regards the Turkish Cypriot community, Mr. Akinci insists on a solution based on Bi-zonal, Bicommunal Federation, as the parties of the centre-left and left parties are also insisting. You know, there is a misconception among both Greek Cypriots and others too. Not every force is the same in a country or community. There are people who support certain points of view and there are others who choose different solutions.

Consequently both within the Turkish Cypriot community, as in the Greek Cypriot community too, in our view, there are forces and circles who are persisting on a solution of Bi-zonal Bi-communal Federation and those who would like to rid themselves of it.

The question is that the international community as a whole is convinced that this framework can constitute the solution of the Cyprus problem. I don’t see any other option, and we have to insist on it. It is our own belief too that it is the only choice of course.

Do you think that the President of the Republic is through his handlings on the Cyprus problem deliberately heading towards another form of solution to the Cyprus problem, to the solution of two states?

AK: I think Mr. Anastasiades is a sufficiently competent and experienced politician and will never lead things in a direction that he will not know what it actually is.

On the question of the issues the President is opening, both regarding decentralized federation and NATO. Do you think that these issues are being opened by Mr. Anastasiades in an attempt to disengage or simply to waste time?

AK: Whichever it is, whatever his effort might be, the conclusion is the same. What did we have after Crans Montana? The UN Secretary-General says “you have to convince me to resume the negotiations on the basis of certain specific elements”.

As to the substance and the procedure, but also on his basis he is asking whether we have the political will this time to go all the way.

Instead of responding to what the Secretary-General asks, Mr. Anastasiades is opening up other issues. Everyone can draw their own conclusions. I therefore consider a delaying policy is being pursued that avoids giving answers on the key issues. He is attempting to transfer the Cyprus problem elsewhere. Certain forces and circles, if things are allowed to drag on, may well come to the conclusion that all this is being done to show that we cannot arrive at any conclusion, so for that reason we should accept something different from what we are discussing today.

Let me make it clear that we will not be convinced either directly or indirectly by such approaches. We will insist to the very end that the choice for Cyprus is the agreed solution, liberation and reunification, the prevalence of Peace and stability on the island and not any adventurist actions

An issue that came up before you departed for Turkey – from where do your assessments stem from about the Israeli Prime Minister’s influence on the President of the Republic, apart from what you told us about Netanyahu’s policy on the Palestinian problem, and therefore with regards the Cyprus problem too? The second point is this: do you have any clear indications that there is a plan for the involvement of NATO?

AK: As for Netanyahu is concerned, I will repeat that I did not say such a thing publicly. I did not say that the one who influenced Mr. Anastasiades is Mr. Netanyahu. What I have said and will say now is that many things are being heard about his role. And these things are being heard frequently. You are journalists, reputable journalists, I am sure you are listening to what is being said which is what we are hearing too. Does this mean that they correspond to reality? Not necessarily. But there is also the possibility that they can indeed correspond to reality. And when you analyze certain issues, you try to see how some moves are being made and you also draw conclusions. And it’s not just what is being heard in public…

Do we have information about the engagement and involvement of NATO? I do not want to reopen the issue, but I repeat and insist, AKEL has also been sounded out on this issue.

The second point I’d like to make, you yourself as journalists wrote that even at the recent meeting between the guarantor powers in New York in September last year, the issue of NATO guarantees was raised. I want to say the following. Is it out of a whim that AKEL disagrees with such a possibility? Well, first and foremost, in order not to deviate from the very essence of the matter, have you seen a case where NATO is defending a member country that is being attacked by another NATO member – like Turkey? Just like what happened in the case of Imia, for example.

But let me refer to the substance of the matter.

NATO is an aggressive organization, there isn’t a conflict on the planet that NATO or NATO member countries aren’t involved. In every corner of the world where there is a source of conflict, NATO is playing its own negative role.

Why should we think that in our case NATO will act differently?

And let’s not forget that according to the findings of the “File of Cyprus” (Note: a special committee commissioned by the House of Representatives to look into the fascist coup and subsequent Turkish invasion of 1974) – and I do not say things that can’t be substantiated – it is at the NATO headquarters where the plan was approved for the execution of the 1974 twin crime was committed against Cyprus and the Cypriot people. The Double Plan (of the fascist coup and subsequent Turkish invasion) was drawn up and elaborated by NATO.

Why should we believe today that NATO would protect us?

I will refer to your last proposal that “they should weigh up whether they can get a solution approved without AKEL”. Is the turn to friendships between DISY-DIKO and the chemistries mentioned by the DISY President perhaps part of this framework? That the President of the Republic and DISY are obviously turning elsewhere to get support because they consider that they will not find support from AKEL?

AK: It is evident that there is a clear shift in the priorities of both Mr. Anastasiades and DISY President Averof Neophytou on internal governance issues. There is an attempt to establish a greater understanding with the parties of the so-called “intermediate centre spectrum”.

This is also reinforced by what the Deputy President of the “Citizens Alliance” party said had happened between the first and second round of the presidential elections when his party had been contacted in relation to the Cyprus problem.

Furthermore, I want to remind you that one your journalist colleagues, a very reputable journalist, the editor-in-chief of “Kathimerini” newspaper, wrote in an article that between the first and the second round Mr. Anastasiades had proposed to the parties of the so-called “intermediate spectrum” a shift from the solution that up till now we have been seeking. And the Anastasiades government never replied to that specific article of this journalist.

Everything therefore indicates that there is a turn. The fact that people are being appointed to various posts from DIKO confirms that there is an informal understanding between the governing DISY party and the Democratic Party. Does this mean that the Democratic Party will support Mr. Anastasiades’ policies on the Cyprus problem? This is to be seen. So far, Mr. Papadopoulos is saying that this will never be supported.

The General Secretary of AKEL replies to journalists’ questions on the critical juncture of the Cyprus problem

AKEL C.C. Press Office, 26 November 2018, Nicosia

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