The calamity which for a decade many had feared became a dreadful reality with the advancement of the Turkish forces in 1974, Brigadier Francis Henn, UNFICYP `s Chief of Staff and Commander of its British Contingent between 1972-1974 tells CNA, in an interview, to mark the 40th anniversary of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus.

He also says that unless Turkey`s strategic interests are fully satisfied, as Ankara sees such interests, a fundamental settlement in Cyprus will remain elusive.

In the interview, Brigadier Henn talks about his experience on the island, which he narrates in a book entitled “A Business of Some Heat” published in the UK in 2004, giving a factual and generally impartial account of events which culminated in Turkey`s invasion in 1974 as seen from an impartial viewpoint at UNFICYP headquarters.

“Twentieth July 1974 will forever be engraved as one of the most critical in the long history of the island of Cyprus and I appreciate the importance of commemorating it on this its 40th anniversary”, he told CNA.

That day will not be remembered by Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots for the same reasons or with the same emotions. “As the former lament the tragedy which struck them, they must never forget that it was the reckless and short-sighted action of the Greek military junta in Athens in mounting the coup d`état against Archbishop Makarios five days earlier which afforded Turkey the perfect excuse for military action and brought nemesis to the island”.

Invited to describe the situation in Cyprus when he arrived, Brigadier Henn said in 1972, he was the Force`s Chief of Staff and Commander of its British Contingent – by far the largest – and left Cyprus in September 1974, when his tour of duty with UNFICYP came to an end. The Force Commander was General Prem Chand of India.

By 1972 UNFICYP had already been on the island for eight years and its role was governed by the terms of UN Security Council Resolution 186 (1964), namely to prevent a recurrence of inter-communal fighting, to contribute to the maintenance of law and order, and a return to normal conditions. In spite of relatively minor, but potentially major, inter-communal military problems which UNFICYP at once sought to dampen down, Brigadier Henn says “the situation was generally calm while inter-communal talks proceeded somewhat intermittently”.

Asked about the main role of UNFICYP prior to the invasion, Brigadier Henn said apart from the above, “there was increased emphasis by the Force to try to settle intercommunal differences of an economic nature; this against a background of increasing economic prosperity, especially on the Greek Cypriot side”.

“A constant problem centred on the question of jurisdiction, namely the exercise of authority in Turkish Cypriot controlled areas. In such cases UNFICYP sought ad hoc temporary arrangements, this being the best that could be done pending a settlement of the island`s fundamental problem”.

All ranks, he said, “were conscious of the fundamental need to maintain a climate of inter-communal calm, conducive to progress in the inter-communal talks”.

Asked how UNFICYP managed to handle the consequences of the war, bearing in mind the reduction in the number of peacekeepers, Brigadier Henn said “the first point that must be understood is that UNFICYP`s Security Council mandate, and therefore its role in Cyprus, was related solely to the dispute between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. It had no authority whatsoever, much less the military capability, to oppose or restrict the military forces of Turkey, a sovereign state and member of the United Nations, which declared that it was acting in accordance with the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee”.

He said “Turkey`s military action created an entirely new situation, neither envisaged in nor provided for by UN Resolution 186 (1964). Pending any Security Council decision as to what UNFICYP`s role in this situation should be, General Prem Chand was told, quite literally, to “play it by ear”.

In his book Brigadier Henn syas “the calamity which for a decade many had feared but which few believed would ever be allowed to happen had become a dreadful reality. It seemed that UNFICYP`s diligent peacekeeping efforts of the past ten years were quite literally going up in smoke. But it was no time for thoughts such as these – the UN Force was on the spot, a disciplined and impartial military body, present on the island as an instrument of the Security Council, and we were determined to do our utmost to minimise the extent of the human tragedy which with our own eyes we could see was befalling stunned Cypriots of all communities.”

To summarise, this is what UNFICYP did to the best of its ability throughout succeeding weeks, he told CNA.

“It soon became clear that UNFICYP (by the summer of 1974 reduced to a strength of about 2340 men) required major reinforcement in order to enable it to take on the many new responsibilities entailed in “playing it by ear”.

The UN Secretary General, Kurt Waldheim, said Brigadier Henn, obtained Security Council authority to increase the Force`s strength quickly to 4300 men, the reinforcements including heavier equipment, such as armoured vehicles, hitherto lacking in UNFICYP. “All these reinforcements played an important part in UNFICYP`s peacekeeping actions, as at Nicosia airport in supervising local ceasefires, and in monitoring ceasefire lines”.

A major consequence of the July/August 1974 events was the island-wide refugee and humanitarian problem. UNFICYP, he remarks, had been quick to see the need to strengthen the Force Headquarters to deal with such matters, and no less quickly established close and harmonious cooperation with the International Red Cross, the UN High Commission for Refugees and other authorities in both of the island`s communities.  Work in this area remained a major commitment for UNFICYP for many months afterwards.

Following the invasion, UNFICYP had to adapt to the changing circumstances which were brought on by the occupation and division. Brigadier Henn said that until the events of July/August 1974 UNFICYP had been deployed to cover sensitive points in all areas of the island, its operational districts general conforming with the government’s Civil Districts. The arrival of the Turkish forces drove a wedge from Kyrenia to the Turkish quarter of Nicosia, which obliged UNFICYP to establish a separate UN operational District on each side of that wedge. Although difficulties arose for UNFICYP to continue operating in areas now under Turkish army control, it continued to be necessary to monitor the position of Turkish Cypriot communities isolated in the south where deployments were retained to this end.

“When after the second phase of the Turkish operation, a ceasefire line developed – UNFICYP was under strict instructions not to determine this itself -, UN troops were redeployed to monitor this. When later in 1974 Turkish Cypriots in the south were transferred to the north, it was no longer necessary to station UN troops in southern districts, and UNFICYP was then concentrated along the lines of confrontation with the purpose of stabilising the situation and establishing a buffer zone and observation posts,” he told CNA.

Invited to assess the situation now, 40 years on, Brigadier Henn said “here I express a personal view, which may not be popular but which I believe to be the reality. Ever since 1974 it has been my firm conviction that the problem of Cyprus is at heart a strategic one, especially relevant to Turkey. I have quoted evidence in my book in support of the view that it has been a major strategic aim of Turkey to ensure that no potentially hostile power (in particular Greece) secures control of northern Cyprus (if not the whole island) and could thus dominate Turkey`s southern approaches.

Turkish forces were held in readiness for many years against this contingency and were twice thwarted by international pressures, but the Greek coup d`état of 15 July 1974 presented them with the ideal opportunity, citing their obligation under the Treaty of Guarantee and the need to protect the Turkish Cypriot community. The Turks did not let slip this perfect open window, their action initially receiving general international support”.

If this view is accepted, then it follows that until some arrangement is devised that fully satisfies Turkish strategic interests (as Ankara sees it) a fundamental settlement in Cyprus will remain elusive, he warns.

“Glafkos Clerides has written that had Archbishop Makarios accepted his advice on 12 December 1972 that the Turkish Cypriots had given sufficient ground on the fundamental question of local government to allow Greek Cypriots, without prejudice to their own interests, to compromise on this point, the coup d`état would have been avoided, the Turkish invasion would not have taken place, and Cypriots would have been spared its devastating consequences. What a missed opportunity”, he concluded.

Over the years of extensive research, Brigadier Henn has accumulated a substantial volume of contemporary information relating to the 1974 events and his “Cyprus Archive” has been deposited in the Imperial War Museum, London.

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